Theft

A person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court

In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales, we said that for such presumption to arise, it must be proven that: (a) the property was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the stolen property was found in the possession of the accused; and (d) the accused is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily(People of the Philippines Vs. Renato Lagat y Gawan, a.k.a. Renat Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa, G.R. No. 187044. September 14, 2011).

Silence as Admission

Benedictos’s silence on a principal charge against her is admission, especially considering that she was given ample opportunity to deny the same (Falsification of Daily Time Records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, A.M. No. P-10-2784. October 19, 2011).

Files in Computer

Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said computer (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011).

Negligence in Selection of Employee

As the employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. Petitioner is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law and may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of his driver, who at the time was acting within the scope of his assigned task, only if he can show that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage (Estacion v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723, February 27, 2006).

Negligence

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.

We cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt Añonuevo’s thesis would unwisely obviate this distinction. (AÑonuevo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004).

Competency

It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano’s capacity at the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown (Catalan v. Basa, G.R. No. 159567, July 31, 2007).

Falsification

Even the presumption that the person who is benefited by the falsified document is presumed to be the author, cannot be applied in this case. Petitioner was not directly benefited by the certificate. It must be pointed out here that the said certification benefited First United Construction Corporation which was granted the construction project, and petitioner was merely an officer of said company and any benefit he may have received from said project would only have been incidental (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 144026, June 15, 2006).

Ownership of Vehicle

A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle creates a strong presumption of ownership in favor of one in whose name it is issued, unless proven otherwise (Amante v. Serwelas, G.R. No. 143572, September 30, 2005).

Death

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.