Conjugal Property

Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. (De Leon v. de Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009)

Knowledge of Law to Enforce

Indeed, we cannot give much weight to the contention that the arresting officers in this case were not trained to apprehend and arrest drug offenders, because as agents of the government in law enforcement they are reasonably presumed to know the laws and the rules they are tasked to enforce. (Carino v. People, G.R. No. 178757, March 13, 2009)

Appearance of Counsel

The presumption in favor of a counsel’s authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one, and a lawyer is not required to present a written authorization from his client. (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177516, March 13, 2009)

Registration under Torrens System

When property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner's title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. (Salandanan v. Mendez, G.R. No. 160280, March 13, 2009)

One Intends Natural Consequences of Act

Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent. (People v. de Leon, G.R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009)

Instruction to Dismiss to Superior

In the instant case, respondent was informed by no less than his immediate superior, the chief cook and by his brother that he was being terminated. Like the Court of Appeals, the Court finds no reason why these two would give respondent the false impression that he was being dismissed, and in turn, the Court, like the appellate court again, is inclined to believe that they were given prior instruction, or they at least had prior knowledge of the termination. (Harborview v. Labro, G.R. No. 168273, April 30, 2009)

Confession

The presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. (People v. Bascugin, G.R. No. 184704, June 30, 2009)

Failure to Rebut

Respondent MICI had all the opportunity to prove before the RTC that its liability under the insurance policy it issued to Rhoda, was limited; yet, respondent MICI failed to do so. The failure of respondent MICI to rebut that which would have naturally invited an immediate, pervasive, and stiff opposition from it created an adverse inference that either the controverting evidence to be presented by respondent MICI would only prejudice its case, or that the uncontroverted evidence of petitioners indeed speaks of the truth. (Poe v. Malayan, G.R. No. 156302, April 7, 2009)